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Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von
(1775–1854), German idealist philosopher.
Schelling contributed to aesthetics early in his career, especially in 1798–1803, years spent in Jena with
the Romantic critics Karl Wilhelm Friedrich von Schlegel, and August Wilhelm von Schlegel, but close
to the classicist Weimar of Friedrich von Schiller and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. His work in
aesthetics was theoretical rather than critical, exploring the interfaces between epistemology,
psychology, and hermeneutics or philosophy of language. On the formal side, he followed Immanuel
Kant in treating aesthetics as a quasi-cognitive domain, but deepened the theory of “aesthetic genius” by
adding an account, inspired by Baruch Spinoza and Goethe, of unconscious knowing and producing in
the artist. By focusing on the dialectic of conscious and unconscious intention in the artist's psyche,
Schelling shifted the inquiry from the cognitive processes of the artist to the work of art itself, to its
multiply determined (or “symbolic”) meaning inside the public world of cultural objects. Implicit in his
treatment of aesthetic production as the function of imagination (Einbildungskraft) was a general theory
of semiotics (or “schematism”). Schelling found symbolism or schematism at work in all artistic
domains: formative, plastic, and literary arts; in this he differed from August Schlegel, who thought the
medium of language necessary for the highest arts.On the side of content, Schelling's originality lay in
his identification of the content of fine art with that of religion, with Greek mythology serving as the
world-historical center of gravity for both art and religion. Rather than preferring classical to Romantic
art, or the reverse, Schelling argued for a necessary unity of objective and subjective modes of symbolic
communication. Modern art—Romantic, Christian, optimistic, embodying the poetics (and politics) of
freedom—is meaningful only in contrast to the structured form and necessity embodied in classic art and
pre-Christian religions. In his critical remarks on specific works, Schelling generally followed Schiller's
in the formative and plastic arts and August Schlegel's in the literary arts, but he defined himself as a
systematic philosopher, not a practicing critic. Whatever the thematic thread that shaped his total
systematic view—identity philosophy (1800–1806), or philosophy of history (1809–1815), or
philosophy of God (1821–1846)—he always viewed philosophy of art as one specialized but culturally
accessible form of philosophical metatheory.
In his early years (1794–1800), Schelling worked alongside Johann Gottlieb Fichte to develop a selfstanding philosophical system based on Kant's critical writings. Fichte brought Kant's three forms of
reason—intellect, will, and judgment—under the umbrella of practical reason. The I is in essence act or
self-deed. Affected by a vanishing but irremovable not-I, the I's act is intelligence. Expressed within the
natural and social worlds, it becomes the various forms of will: biological drive, emotive striving,
arbitrary choice, submission to social and moral laws. The watchword of Fichte's Kantianism was the
“primacy of praxis.” It left a deep imprint on Goethe's Faust, on Friedrich Hölderlin's poetry, and on the
critical theories of the Schlegel brothers.
While Schelling supported the program of Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre as the logical ground for any
transcendental philosophy, his early essays of 1794–1800 search for an alternate real ground for
systematic philosophy. The 1797 Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature supplements Fichte's account of
consciousness with a philosophy of nature inspired by Kant's Metaphysical Foundations for Natural
Philosophy. Schelling argued that the same opposed activities that transcendental philosophy postulates
to explain the “I think” of consciousness also explain the ladder of natural phenomena, from matter up to
the animated body that is the platform of consciousness. Just as the I is “constructed” (i.e., explained) as

a dynamic interplay of two activities, one unbounded, another limiting, so matter's basic property of
filling space is explained as a dynamic balance between expansive and contractive forces.
A second attempt to systematize Kant's philosophy is found in the 1800 System of Transcendental
Idealism. Following the clue of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Humanity, Schelling
makes aesthetics the region that unites theoretical and practical philosophy, not the passive experience
of viewer, auditor, or reader, but the peculiar productive activity of the artist: “aesthetic intuition.” In
Kant's language, an intuition of x is both my representation of x and the production of the x represented.
In producing the work of art, the “intuitive” creator performs a knowing-as-doing that is more
fundamental than the nonproductive knowing and the noncognitive production that differentiate
“knowing” and “doing” in other phenomenal contexts. Also, conscious and unconscious productivity,
the forces constructive of the natural and social worlds, merge here in the artist's psyche as the interplay
of conscious and unconscious intention. In the very independence of the finished work of art from the
material and psychological sources of its production is proof that the artist produces more than she
literally knows.
How can artistic production ground a philosophical system or serve as the capstone for a series of other
philosophical inquiries? Schelling argued that because the artist's activity—aesthetic intuition—taps into
the primary divided energy that first produces an objective world for the I and then ceaselessly conquers
its objectivity by the I's knowledge and action, it is not a case of ordinary activity but a laying bare of
foundations. What kinship can there be between the ground of being and the artist's activity?
In the 1800 System, Schelling utilized a vocabulary given currency by Kant and Fichte for naming the
ultimate active ground of being. Kant had defined sensible intuition in opposition to a hypothetical
intellectual intuition where, for example, God knowing y would also mean God realizes y or causes it to
exist; Kant first noted in 1770 that artists seem to have some faculty analogous to this conceptually
defined divine creativity. Fichte had used the term to designate the immediate certainty of agency
involved in self-consciousness, the doing involved in the thinking of “I think.” Schelling now uses
intellectual intuition to indicate at the start of the system a pure (thus empirically unavailable) act of
spontaneity that transcendental philosophy must postulate to explain self-consciousness: the analytical I
= I that mutates into the synthetic I=∼I. The philosopher imitates this primal act by a freely undertaken
conscious exercise—mediated by language, hence by imagination and by time, the primary schematism.
The philosophical narrative that results is a “construction of consciousness”; in it the original synthesis
of the I, which would be both conceptually clear and empirically there if the philosopher had the
(merely) postulated intellectual intuition, is unpacked into epochs of the “history” of understanding and
will. Schelling is clear that this “history of consciousness” is just an explanatory device; his work as a
philosopher is primarily imaginative in Kant's sense: it translates the all-at-once of the I's selfconstituting act (the fundamental synthesis that cannot be understood) into a series of acts that are at
once objective and subjective (and that explain each other, at least minimally, in their succession). These
acts form a “pragmatic history” of consciousness—not an empirical history, but a heuristic construction
that shows how the features of self-consciousness and of objective nature nest inside the original
synthetic act like Chinese boxes.
Despite the brilliance of these initial moves, Schelling was unable to close the story of the unfolding
consciousness with a return to original identity. The inability rested on a logical prohibition. Because
transcendental philosophy aimed at establishing the conditions for the possibility of experience, what

explains and what is to be explained must be of different orders, one hypothetical, the other empirical. If
the transcendental philosopher posits spontaneous self-realizing activity as the nonempirical explanatory
element, and meanwhile uses analysis of that activity to explain the structure of both natural and social
phenomenal worlds, he must in the end bring forward some empirical explanandum that is obviously a
case of spontaneous self-realizing activity. If the tie-down to experience is lacking, there is no
explanation, and a metaphysical fantasy has been perpetrated. Schelling was able to argue to the case of
spontaneously self-realizing activity (“aesthetic intuition”) only from the ambiguous status of the work
of art once it is detached from the process of its production. Because a work—say, Goethe's Faust—has
different meanings to various actors, directors, and critics, Schelling maintained that the work carried an
unanalyzable multitude of meanings, and that the artist, consciously and unconsciously, endowed the
play with all these meanings. He thus thought that the work displayed the existence of the infinite (at
least the indefinitely multiple) in the finite and that, therefore, the artist's aesthetic intuition was an
empirical case of the postulated intellectual intuition, everywhere informing but factually missing in the
philosopher's activity. Schelling thus surmised that aesthetic intuition was the phenomenal analogue of
the (empirically absent) intellectual intuition claimed by the philosopher.
Although the transcendental stance of Schelling's early philosophy and the prominence he accorded
aesthetic intuition in the 1800 System were not permanent features of his philosophy, they captured the
political, moral, and religious yearning of the Romantic poets and literary critics who were first Fichte' s,
then Schelling' s, fellows at the University of Jena. These features of Schelling's thought found their way
into Samuel Taylor Coleridge's Biographia Literaria, and from there into English Romantic literature
and American Transcendental philosophy. That Coleridge assembled its twelfth chapter on productive
imagination from various early texts of Schelling occasioned the charges and countercharges about
plagiarism that have followed that author and his editors.
Schelling's preference for aesthetic intuition over discursive reasoning as the philosopher's tool in the
1800 System threatened to dissolve philosophy itself into literary theory (or Poesie as it was then called).
In 1801, Schelling pulled back from this radical aestheticism and, in a third phase of philosophical
innovation, announced an absolute system, which he casually called “Identity Philosophy.” In
Presentation of My System of Philosophy, (Darstellung meines System der Philosophie, 1927) Schelling
claimed that the philosopher not merely presupposes but possesses intellectual intuition, the synoptic
faculty that Kant called “pure reason.” If the philosopher distances himself from what is arbitrary and
subjective in his thought the way the artist distances himself from his personality, he can move in and
with reason and so with purely logical means construct a theory of the absolute. The philosopher posits a
logical domain of pure identity on the basis of concrete identities seen within the items of experience.
Because these identities are combinatory, fashioned from differences, their mode of being is identity-indifference; their conceptualization demands not a logic of bare identity but one that integrates universals
and particulars, concepts and intuitions. These integrative structures motivate the philosopher's
postulation of a ground of explanation whose logic is not that of abstract identity as opposed to
difference, but of indifference or the identity of opposites. This absolute is a transcendental (or heuristic)
posit, a noumenal unity of everything that phenomenally manifests itself as connected by difference.
Because this move is made with the necessity and universality of thought, Schelling felt that philosophy
had become methodologically self-sufficient and no longer needed to appeal to the artist's aesthetic
intuition as an empirical correlate of intellectual intuition. The 1802 dialogue Bruno demoted the artist
to an unconscious collaborator of the philosopher. The artist, it is now said, produces an infinite fund of

meaning in the work of art not by conscious agency, but by an unconscious outworking of a reality
contained in the absolute as an “idea.” This idea is the “soul” of the artist, but it comes to expression
only partially and in distorted form in the artist's psyche and in the bodily movements that produce the
separate artifact. This explains why there is so much bad art that is “personal,” and so little grand art that
is universal: most artists have small “souls” or limited empirical personalities. Bruno thus demoted
artistic creativity from a transcendent to a robotic activity. What Schelling viewed as the conscious and
unconscious character of aesthetic intuition in the 1800 System is viewed as merely unconscious
production in 1802.
In 1802–1803 and 1804–1805, Schelling lectured on the philosophy of art. He did not publish these
lectures in his lifetime, perhaps because of his dependence on August Wilhelm von Schlegel's Berlin
lectures On Dramatic Art and Literature (1801–1803) for critical evaluation of particular literary artists
and their achievements, for example, of Dante Alighieri's poetry and the plays of Pedro Calderón de la
Barca and William Shakespeare. The lectures stand, nonetheless, as Schelling's most important
contribution to aesthetic theory. In the general parts of the lectures, the topics of imagination, language,
and symbolism are used to present the metaphysics of identity. The treatment of symbolism as a general
function of expression stands on its own outside the metaphysical theory and is of interest to
contemporary readers because Schelling used language itself as his primary example of a “symbol” or
materially expressed meaning.
Once he had subjugated the arts to philosophy as inferior domains of cognition, as he had in 1802,
Schelling could approach philosophy of art as a suitable vehicle for presenting metaphysics. If one can
mix—as the later Schelling frequently did—abstract talk of “the absolute” with talk of the object of
religion, the fine arts are the place where “God-talk” and metaphysics overlap. Not only are the contents
of the highest visual and literary forms of fine art religious, but all the arts come to be in activities of
expression or informing—Einbildung, as in Einbildungskraft, imagination. The absolute, or “God” in the
language of these lectures, has an autopoetic or imaginative form of being; its essence is to express or
affirm itself, to translate its reality from unarticulated identity into a differentiated world of form. As the
essential identity of universality and particularity, or ideality and reality, God is the source of the various
projections of one factor upon the other that make the phenomenal world a series of images
(Einbildungen) of the absolute. God's perfect self-affirmation is the identification (Ineinsbildung) or
equal informing of universality and particularity into perfect particulars or “ideas.”
With these general metaphysical structures in place—God as expressive, informing universality and
particularity into ideas in the absolute, and occasioning “reflected” imagings of ideas in the two
phenomenal domains of nature and human culture—Schelling is able to generate a philosophical model
of the cultural world as detailed and compelling as the model of nature he constructed in the two editions
of Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature. The ideal phenomenal universe—which Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel calls “spirit”—is structurally the reflection of reality (or particularity) into ideality (or
universality). The root identity (of real and ideal) is expressed in three stages or under three powers: on
the objective level as knowledge, on the subjective as action, and on the highest level as art, where the
two factors are posited as equal. The realm of art is thus the place where ideality is realized in perfect,
crystalline form as ideas or perfect particulars and where subjectivity is perfectly manifested in objective
shape, as in the bodies the Greeks gave to their gods and goddesses in ancient sculpture. Schelling did
not think it was accidental that the most penetrating naive art portrayed ideas as individual gods.
Although he was aware of the mythologies of other cultures and keenly interested in the phenomena of

comparative religion, Schelling asserted that the world of the Greek Olympians was the paradigmatic
content of all art. The love of all things Greek fostered by German classicism and the unconscious
Eurocentrism fostered by Christianity conspired in Schelling to shape the narrow view that art can have
only two sorts of contents: the realistic mythology of Greece with its poetics of eternity and the idealistic
mythology of Christianity's attempts to display the workings of providence in history.
Schelling's remarks on the formal side of art expanded on the idea of “expression” that ties God to the
universe or phenomenal worlds; they also build on August Schlegel's discussions of original language as
part of Naturpoesie. All art is symbolic in a general sense, because it is at once the purest expression of
the absolute's ideality, but in an objectified form, under the guise of pure sensuous objectivity. Language
is the basic symbol because it is idea materialized, its first conceptual expression. There are three
specialized sorts of symbolism: schematism, where the particular is intended by the universal (as in
painting or generally in language); allegory, where the universal is intended by the particular (as in
music); and symbolism proper, where universal and particular are one (as in the plastic arts). The
subjugation of all fine arts to language and of the metaphysics of art to symbolic expression makes it
clear that Schelling assimilated art to cognition, and that his theory could comprehend art only insofar as
it served a cognitive or informational function. There is little discussion of the sensuous in his lectures
on the Philosophy of Art and no hint of the possibilities that later art forms explore of manipulating the
sensuous media themselves to produce nonrepresentative content.
Schelling made a final contribution to aesthetic theory in an 1807 essay, “Concerning the Relationship
of the Plastic Arts to Nature.” This essay repeats themes familiar from the Identity Philosophy, for
example, the way good art strikes a balance between naturalism and formalism, exhibited perfectly in
the concreteness whereby the “ideas” of mythology and religion are shown in painting and sculpture.
New to Schelling's theory as he advanced toward the Philosophy of Freedom of 1809 and thereafter are
the ideas that art redeems a nature intrinsically frustrated and sorrowful and that, in artistic creator and
spectator alike, the agent that unifies form and matter and that perceives their essence is “spirit” (Geist).
After 1807, Schelling's interests in the arts and in philosophy of language fade as he gravitates toward
philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. The aesthetic vehicle is discarded as the philosopher
becomes confident of a historical-anthropological access to God.
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